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“I want to remind you that Russia is one of the 
 most powerful nuclear nations. This is  
a reality, not just words.” Vladimir Putin 
 
“We must always be ready to repel any  
aggression against Russia and (opponents)  
should be aware … it is better not to come  
against Russia as regards a possible armed  
conflict.” Vladimir Putin 
 
Vladimir Putin is a divisive figure. To the Western world he 
is considered the reincarnation of Hitler and the old Russian Tsars, 
although one who hunts bare-chested and hugs bears, with the 
National Review on 3 September 2014 going so far as to say he had 
a ‘Hitlerian mind’ and that his Russia was in the midst of a ‘fascist 
revival’. The majority of Putin’s time as Prime Minister and 
President (1999 – Present) has corresponded with increasing 
Russian power and influence, regionally as well as globally. This 
increase in global influence demonstrated itself most clearly as 
Putin was able to determine US actions in Syria in 2012. This 
polarising of Putin is intriguing from a historical and political 
standpoint as is the venomous hatred spat at Putin and Russia in the 
time of political and military crisis. 
Ludwig Von Rochau describes a way of acting in politics (a 
term later referred to as realpolitik) in his book Grundsätze der 
Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände Deutschlands. 
Rochau where he states that ‘the study of the powers that shape, 
maintain and alter the state is the basis of all political insight and 
leads to the understanding that the law of power governs the world 
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of states just as the law of gravity governs the physical world.’ 
Power politics then, without the negativity now associated with the 
term. Realists in the political realm argue that states act out of their 
self-interest, rather than any particular ideology. Now, obviously, 
historically there were many heads of states that acted out of an 
ideological interest, one may think of Hitler’s hatred of 
Communists for example. However, as Peter Monteath argues in 
his paper Hitler and the Spanish Civil War: A Case Study of Nazi 
Foreign Policy, ‘Hitler’s decisions [were] ideologically and 
geopolitically motivated, whereby it is impossible to distinguish 
ideological from geopolitical considerations.’ To draw back to the 
point at hand despite the suggestions and psychoanalysis of Putin in 
the West, where has he acted that is not in Russia’s best interests? 
Is it possible that we ascribe to Putin as well as Hitler that his 
decisions have been ‘ideologically and geopolitically motivated’? 
We will come back to this question later on.  
Geopolitics is a field of study that links geography with 
political action. The strictest adherents of this school, whilst 
recognising other factors, argue that the determining factor in 
political considerations and the condition of the world is 
geography. For example the British Empire was so large because 
being separated from continental Europe through the fifteenth to 
eighteenth centuries, Britain could limit the damage from the 
severe continental wars, dictate its own involvement, and play 
continental powers against each other. Also the reason the US is the 
predominant world power is because of their geographical position. 
The US has access to two oceans, is geographically separated from 
the world’s powers, has two significant navigable internal rivers 
and is bordered by two relatively weak nations. The US is where it 
is now because after the war of 1812 it has never been invaded by a 
hostile nation, whilst being able to dominate shipping lanes after 
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the decline of the British Empire. On the adverse of these success 
stories is the tale of Northern Europe. The North European Plain 
provides an effective highway from Northern Russia through 
Poland and Germany. There are no natural geographical barriers to 
invasion (either way). Therefore the traditional consideration of 
Germany has been to be powerful enough militarily to withstand an 
invasion from the east, whereas traditionally Russia has fought very 
hard to withstand invasion from the west. 
‘Russia is…in an untenable position,’ explains George 
Friedman. ‘Unless Russia exerts itself to create a sphere of 
influence, the Russian Federation could itself fragment.’ Friedman 
wrote this argument in his 2009 book The Next 100 Years. 
Friedman argues that Russia’s geopolitical necessity to create for 
itself a western buffer, which will in the first quarter of the twenty-
first century devolve into another cold war (which Russia cannot 
win). However Friedman also acknowledges that for Russia to have 
any chance at survival as a federation it needs to extend its buffer 
states. This is nothing new, Russia has been doing it for centuries. 
In the nineteenth Century this was the genesis behind the race for 
empire, or the Great Game as it has come to be called. This leads to 
the other relevant point, that Russia is not alone in its attempts to 
create a favourable position in its near neighbourhood. The US has 
been doing it for the duration of its history, China is making the 
same attempts in the South China Sea, its recent efforts in Hong 
Kong, and the standoff with Taiwan, and all nations to some extent 
attempt to manipulate their immediate neighbourhood to better 
their own political position (case in point, Australian involvement 
in the Solomon Islands, or the amount of money given in aid to 
Indonesia). Matthew Fitzpatrick wrote for The Drum regarding the 
Russian actions in Crimea on March 4 that ‘What protestors in 
Kiev see as a movement for freedom and prosperity looks to 
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Moscow like a hybrid US/German empire reaching into the Russian 
sphere of influence.’ Fitzpatrick’s argument is that the Russian 
involvement in Ukraine is not a new imperial foreign policy, but 
merely a continuation of the geostrategic decisions that have faced 
Russia for centuries, as explained above. Fitzpatrick continues: 
‘Russia is happy for independent states to exist on its doorstep, but 
these states must not join the Western Security pact aimed at 
Russia: NATO.’ 
And so we reach the crux of the issue; Russia has constantly 
stated publicly that it sees the demonstrations and overthrow of the 
Ukrainian government as 1) illegal and 2) directed, supported and 
funded by the West (read US/UK/Germany) as a deliberate attempt 
to draw Ukraine into a pro-west stance. Further, Russia cannot be 
moved on Crimea. First, from 1783 to 1954 Crimea was part of 
Russia and the Soviet Union and one of Russia’s most important 
naval bases is Sevastopol, the home of the Black Sea Fleet. Crimea 
further is estimated to have approximately 77% of its population 
speak Russian and identify as Russian. Further, Ukraine decided 
that it no longer wanted its ‘democratically’ elected government 
through the application of protest and violence, however when 
Crimea decided that it would not recognise the new Ukrainian 
government and wanted to secede to Russia this was considered 
illegal and morally objectionable in the international community 
and a definitive sign of Russian intrigue and influence in the 
region. Going back to the Ukrainian mainland, in 2008 Russia 
demonstrated to the international community that it would not 
tolerate hostile states on its borders in the invasion of Georgia. The 
West and Ukraine itself has consistently and deliberately provoked 
Russia into a reaction over the Ukrainian crisis. What Russia is 
observing is aptly described by Fitzpatrick thus: What prior to 1989 
was called "containment of the Soviet menace" has since been an 
FJHP – Volume 30 – 2014 
55 
incremental push to deny Russia any influence in its immediate 
region. Not content with peeling off ex-Soviet territories, NATO 
and the EU have denuded Russia of all its remaining buffer states. 
All that remain are Ukraine and Georgia. 
Is it not enough now to agree that Russia is acting as a state 
that aspires to regional influence must act? Putin is not insane, 
crazy, irrational, or Hitlerian. Putin is acting as the head of the 
Russian Federation and thus is intent on resisting threats to Russian 
Sovereignty. Is this to excuse illegal action within Ukraine, loss of 
life, and recent threat of nuclear action? Of course not, however 
speaking realistically here, what other course of action should 
Russia take? Let us now draw some parallels across the 
international community. Historically one of the reasons the US is 
now the sole world power is because of its foreign interference 
when considered necessary. Some examples can be seen in Mexico, 
Canada, Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan. Some of these actions were declared wars while 
some were deliberately clandestine and deniable (and denied) by 
the Government. Also actions of US Special Forces are, in the 
west, acclaimed and at times celebrated, as are the actions 
Australian and British SAS forces. However, many of the actions 
of these Special Forces are 1) illegal under international law, 2) 
most clearly infringe with other nations’ sovereignty, 3) unofficial 
and denied by their own government and 4) performed whilst not 
wearing the official military uniform of the country of origin. The 
parallels here with the universally (in the West) denounced actions 
of the Russian military should be readily apparent.  
Friedman succinctly demonstrated the events that are 
occurring within Ukraine at the moment, even though he was 
writing six years ago.    
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Russia's grand strategy involves the creation of deep 
buffers along the North European Plain, while it divides 
and manipulates its neighbours, creating a new regional 
balance of power in Europe. What Russia cannot tolerate 
are tight borders without buffer zones, and its neighbours 
united against it. This is why Russia's future actions will 
appear to be aggressive but will actually be defensive. 
 
Further what is NATO but an anti-Russian military 
organisation? To be sure it began in the Cold War as a military 
alliance against expansionist USSR, however since the end of the 
cold war there was no drawdown of NATO, no attempts to 
integrate Russia into NATO even with the peace agreements signed 
between the two, and as the Ukraine conflict demonstrates 
deliberate attempts on the behalf of NATO and the EU to draw 
peripheral states into their sphere of influence rather than Russia’s. 
To tie now into the beginning of this piece where is all the venom 
and hatred coming from in the West? Is the majority view of 
western political leaders and media outlets that Russia has now 
swung to being Fascist? Is this a result of the cult of personality 
that Putin so deliberately cultivates? If we are to take Friedman at 
his word, Putin is not aggressively domineering in Russia’s 
neighbourhood; Russia does not intend to subsume Ukraine. Putin 
intends that Russia’s immediate neighbourhood remains friendly 
toward Russia, hostile interference remain buffered from Russia’s 
borders, and Russia maintains its regional primacy. For any middle 
power aspiring to regional leadership and primacy what less could 
be suspected in a world dominated by power politics? 
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